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Since Vickrey (1961)’s seminal paper, the literature on auctions has grown very rapidly. Most
of this literature, though, deals with the case of risk neutral buyers (see, for example, Riley
and Samuelson (1981), Myerson (1981) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) to name only a few very
inﬂuential papers). Notable exceptions are Matthews (1983), Maskin and Riley (1984), Moore
(1984), and Matthews (1987), among others, who take risk aversion into account. If results
about auctions with risk averse buyers are scarce, the analysis of auctions with non-expected
utility maximizers is almost nonexistent. Salo and Weber (1995) and Lo (1998) are among the
few papers that take auction theory outside the expected utility paradigm.
The diﬃculty in the analysis of risk aversion in auctions stems from the nonlinearity of
preferences in money. This may sound tautological because under the expected utility hypothesis,
risk aversion is equivalent to the concavity of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function.
But if one is willing to drop the assumption of expected utility maximization, there is no reason
to identify risk aversion with decreasing marginal utility of money. Yaari (1987) proposed a
theory of choice under risk which allows for the co-existence of both risk aversion and linearity of
preferences in payments. Although the linearity of preferences in money is not the most appealing
assumption, it can make the analysis of auctions with risk averse buyers as simple as in the case
of risk neutral buyers. Also, unlike other non-expected utility theories, Yaari’s dual theory of
choice under risk is not a generalization of the expected utility theory. This means that the
auction theory developed from it is no weaker than the standard one and thus one can expect
very diﬀerent and sometimes contradictory predictions from them.
One of the most celebrated results in the theory of auctions is the revenue equivalence theorem.
It states, roughly, that in the single item, private i.i.d. values framework, there is a large family of
auction mechanisms (which contains the standard auctions) that yield the same expected revenue.
The other side of the revenue equivalence theorem is the fact that all bidders are indiﬀerent among
the auctions in that family. While it is well known that revenue equivalence breaks down as soon
as risk aversion is allowed, Matthews (1987) shows, that when buyers share the same constant
absolute risk aversion von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, they are indiﬀerent between
the ﬁrst price and second price auctions. The main result of this paper is that in the private i.i.d.
values framework, when buyers’ risk preferences follow the dual theory axioms, there is a large
family of auctions (which contains the standard ones), among which buyers are indiﬀerent. That
is, although there is no revenue equivalence when buyers’s preferences exhibit risk aversion, it is
still true that they are indiﬀerent between participating in any auction in the above family.
The paper also shows the eﬀect of changes in the degree of risk aversion on the revenue
maximizing reserve price of the high bid auction. It turns out, as in the case of expected utility
preferences, that an increase in buyers’ degree of risk aversion results in a decrease in the seller’s
optimal reserve price.
1Preferences that satisfy the expected utility axioms diﬀer from those that satisfy the dual the-
ory axioms. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst price auction the equilibrium bidding function
when buyers’ von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is given by u(x)=x1/m,f o rm>1, is
identical to the equilibrium bidding function when buyers’ Yaari “probability-evaluation” func-
tion is the inverse of u. This result does not generalize to other utility functions and can be
regarded as purely coincidental.
Lastly, we calculate the linear equilibrium of the sealed-bid double auction analyzed in Chat-
terjee and Samuelson (1983), when buyer and seller behave according to the dual theory and have
probability-evaluation functions given by simple polynomials. In this case, as in the case of risk
neutral buyers, the equilibria are ex post ineﬃcient, since it is not true that there is trade if and
only if the value for the buyer is at least as large as the value for the seller. It turns out, however,
that the ineﬃciency vanishes as the degree of the traders’ risk aversion becomes arbitrarily large.
Also, it is shown that an increase in the buyer’s degree of risk aversion uniformly increases the
equilibrium terms of trade. Similarly, an increase in the seller’s degree of risk aversion uniformly
decreases the equilibrium terms of trade.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents a short review of Yaari’s theory of
choice under risk. After presenting the equilibrium bidding strategies in a few standard auctions,
Section 2 gives the main result of the paper: the utility equivalence of many auction mechanisms.
It also contains some results concerning the eﬀect of risk aversion on the ﬁrst price auction.
Section 3 looks into the eﬀect of risk aversion on the linear equilibrium of the sealed-bid double
auction. Section 4 concludes.
1 A Short Review of the Dual Theory of Choice Under Risk
Given a random variable r, deﬁned on some probability space Ω and taking values in some real
interval [m,1], let Gr be its decumulative distribution function (DDF), which is deﬁned by
Gr(x)=P r {r>x },m ≤ x ≤ 1.
It is known that Gr is nonincreasing, right-continuous and satisﬁes Gr(1) = 0. The random
variable r, represents a lottery over monetary outcomes or, if the reader prefers, an asset that
pays the monetary amount r(ω) at state ω ∈ Ω.
The primitive of the dual theory is the set Γ of all nonincreasing, right-continuous functions
G :[ m,1] → [0,1] that satisfy G(1) = 0. This set is interpreted as the set of all DDFs associated
with some random variable deﬁned on some suﬃciently rich probability space and taking values
in [m,1]. The area under a DDF in Γ resembles a production possibilities set and the problem
of ranking DDFs is essentially the same as ranking production possibilities sets.
Let   be a complete preference relation on Γ. Yaari (1987) imposes the following axioms on
2 :
1. Continuity (with respect to L1-convergence),
2. Monotonicity: if Gr ≥ Gs then Gr   Gs,
3. Dual independence: r, s and t are pairwise comonotonic and Gr   Gs, then Gαr+(1−α)t  
Gαs+(1−α)t.
Continuity is a technical requirement. Monotonicity requires that if Gr stochastically dom-
inates Gs then Gr   Gs. The dual independence axiom is where the dual theory departs from
the traditional expected utility theory. It deals with portfolios of comonotonic random vari-
ables. Note that αr +( 1− α)t denotes the random variable that awards αr(ω)+( 1− α)t(ω)
at state ω ∈ Ω. In particular, it is not the probability mixture of the random variables r
and t. Two random variables, r and s, are comonotonic if for every pair of states, ω and ω ,
(r(ω) − r(ω ))(s(ω) − s(ω )) ≥ 0. In words, r and s are comonotonic if, when going from state
ω to ω  in Ω, both random variables move (weakly) in the same direction. Dual independence
requires that whenever r, s and t are pairwise comonotonic and Gr   Gs, then any portfolio
containing a proportion α of r and 1−α of t should be weakly preferred to a portfolio containing
α of s and 1 − α of t.
Before we present Yaari’s representation theorem we need the following notation. For any
monetary outcome x and probability p,[ x;p] denotes the lottery that yields x with probability
p and m with the complementary probability. With the aid of the above axioms Yaari (1987)
shows the following:
Theorem 1 A complete preference relation   satisﬁes continuity, monotonicity and dual inde-
pendence if, and only if, there exists a continuous and non decreasing real function, g,d e ﬁ n e do n
the unit interval, such that for all Gr and Gs belonging to Γ,







Moreover, the function g, which is unique up to a positive aﬃne transformation, can be selected
in such a way that, for all p ∈ [0,1], g(p) solves the preference equation
[1;p] ∼ [g(p);1]. (1)
The function g is analogous to the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and, in a sense,
we can say that g represents the agent’s preferences. However, since it takes probabilities as an
input, we can call it a “probability-evaluation” function instead of utility function.
3Graphically, an agent whose preferences are described by the dual theory evaluates random
variables according to the area under a suitable transformation (the function g) of their DDF.
Analogously, an agent whose preferences satisfy the expected utility axioms, evaluates random
variables according to the area “to the left” of a suitable transformation (the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function) of the (generalized) inverse of their DDF.





where g is deﬁned in equation 1. This representation ensures that the utility of $y with certainty
is y, for all y ∈ [m,1]. Theorem 1 says that agents will chose among random variables so as
to maximize U. Further, Yaari (1987) also shows that for any random variable r, the agent
is indiﬀerent between r and getting U(r) with certainty. In other words, U(r) is the certainty
equivalent of r. Another important property of he above representation is that the utility of
the sum of two comonotonic random variables is equal to the sum of their respective utilities.
Formally, if r and s are comonotonic random variables then U(r + s)=U(r)+U(s).
One of the appealing features of the dual theory is that, unlike under the expected utility
theory, the agent’s attitude towards risk is not entangled with his attitude towards wealth. More
speciﬁcally, under the dual theory, the marginal utility of wealth is constant and this feature
is consistent with any attitude towards risk. Speciﬁcally, Yaari (1987) shows that a preference
relation   that satisﬁes the dual theory’s axioms exhibits risk aversion if and only if the function
g that represents   is convex. The property of constant marginal utility of wealth is not a
particularly appealing feature of individual preferences, but it is not especially unappealing when
one wants to model ﬁrm behavior. One may want to think of a ﬁrm as being, on the one hand,
risk averse, while on the other hand as evaluating each additional dollar independently of the
level of wealth (or proﬁts). This kind of behavior is precluded by the expected utility hypothesis.
Also, while the linearity of preferences in money is and admittedly unrealistic assumption, within
the dual theory it constitutes a relaxation of the straight-jacket imposed by the usual assumption
of risk neutrality.
In this paper we are interested in the eﬀect of changes in the degree of agents’ risk aversion on
equilibrium outcomes. For this purpose, it is necessary to understand what it means for one agent
to be more risk averse than another. As Yaari (1986) says, since risk aversion is characterized by
the convexity of the function g, it would be natural to deﬁne an agent as being more risk averse
than the another if, and only if, the former’s g is more convex than the latter’s. Formally, we
have the following:1
1See Yaari (1986) for various and equivalent interpretations of this deﬁnition.
4Deﬁnition 1 Let  1 and  2 be two preference relations that satisfy the dual theory’s axioms
and that are represented by the functions g1 and g2, respectively. We say that  1 is more risk
averse than  2 if, and only if, there exists a convex function h, deﬁned on the unit interval, such
that g1 = h ◦ g2.
The linearity of preferences in monetary outcomes and the characterization of risk aversion as
the convexity of the function g that represents them make the dual theory very appealing for the
analysis of auctions. The linearity of the utility functional in wealth makes the analysis not too
cumbersome and in some cases as simple as the case of risk neutral buyers. The characterization
of the risk attitude by means of the convexity of a univariate nondecreasing function makes it
relatively easy to analyze the eﬀect of risk aversion on the outcome of auctions. These observations
determine our task in the following sections.
2 Auctions with the Dual Theory
In order to motivate the main result of this paper, we start by calculating the equilibrium strate-
gies of three standard auctions and the corresponding buyers’ utilities.
There are n potential bidders, each of whose valuations for the object is drawn independently
from a strictly increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function F :[ 0 ,1] →
[0,1].
Bidders’ preferences satisfy the dual theory’s axioms and are represented by the dual function
g :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] which is normalized so that g(0) = 0 and g(1) = 1.
Second price auction
According to the second price auction with reserve price b0, all participating bidders simultane-
ously bid a price b ∈ [b0,∞) and the object is awarded to the bidder who bids the highest price.
(In case of a tie, the object is randomly awarded to one of the bidders who made the highest bid,
according to some ﬁxed random rule.) The winner pays a price equal to the highest bid among
the losers’ bids or b0, whichever is highest.
As bidders whose valuation of the object is less than the reserve price have no incentive to
participate in the auction, consider bidder 1 with a valuation of v ≥ b0.A n y b i d b deﬁnes the
random variable of bidder 1’s earnings, which is denoted by ˜ eb. It is well known that the random
variable ˜ ev stochastically dominates ˜ eb for all b  = v and therefore, since the agents’ preferences
are monotonic with respect to stochastic dominance, we conclude that a symmetric equilibrium
in this game dictates that all buyers with valuation v ≥ b0 should bid their true valuation.
Letting ˜ vi denote the random variable of buyer i’s true valuation, in equilibrium the earnings
5of bidder 1, whose valuation for the object is v ≥ b0, are distributed as follows:
Pr(˜ ev >e )=P r ( [ v − max(b0, ˜ v2,...,˜ vn)]+ >e )
=

   
   
1i f e<0
Fn−1(v − e)i f 0 ≤ e<v− b0
0i f e ≥ v − b0.
Since all the buyers are ex ante identical and the rules of the game are anonymous, the interim









According to this auction mechanism, bidders who wish to participate submit bids above the
reservation price b0, and the bidder with the highest bid gets the object for which he pays his
own bid.
Again, we are interested in ﬁnding a symmetric equilibrium, where the common equilibrium
bidding strategy, β, is invertible. Buyers who value the object below the reservation price have
no incentive to participate. Therefore consider a bidder with valuation v ≥ b0, and assume that
he bids b ≤ v (bidding more than the true valuation can never be optimal), while the other
bidders play according to the equilibrium strategy β. We ﬁrst need to calculate the decumulative
distribution of his earnings, ˜ eb, which is easily seen to be
Pr(˜ e>e )=

   
   
1i f e<0
Fn−1(β−1(b)) if 0 ≤ e<v− b
0i f e ≥ v − b.
Therefore the agent’s utility when the other bidders behave according to β is
U(v,b)=
  1
0 g(Pr(˜ e>e ))de
=( v − b)g(Fn−1(β−1(b))).
(2)
Using a standard argument we can now deduce that the symmetric equilibrium strategy of a











which is the same utility he gets from participating in the second price auction.
All pay auction
According to this auction mechanism, each bidder pays his own bid but only the bidder who bids
the highest price gets the object.
Again, we are interested in ﬁnding a symmetric equilibrium, β. Consider a bidder with
valuation v>b 0, and assume that he bids b ≤ v while the other bidders play according to the
equilibrium strategy β. The decumulative distribution of his earnings, ˜ eb is given by
Pr(˜ eb >e )=

   
   
1i f e<−b
Fn−1(β−1(b)) if − b ≤ e<v− b
0i f e ≥ v − b.
Therefore the utility for an agent with valuation v of a bid b when the other bidders behave




= −b + vg(Fn−1(β−1(b)).
(4)











which is the same utility he gets from participating in a ﬁrst or second price auction.
Utility equivalence
The utility equivalence of the above three auctions, suggests that there might be a large family of
auctions among which ex ante identical buyers are indiﬀerent. This is what we want to investigate
in this section.
7There are n bidders, each of whose valuations of the single object is independently drawn from
a strictly increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function Fi :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1].
We denote by F−i :[ 0 ,1]n−1 → [0,1] the joint distribution of all the bidders’ valuations except
for bidder i.
Every equilibrium of an auction game, can be associated to an incentive compatible direct
revelation mechanism (see Myerson (1981)). In our case, letting V =[ 0 ,1]n be the set of possible
valuation proﬁles, a direct revelation mechanism is deﬁned as an n-tuple  (Ii,t i)n
i=1  of pairs of
functions, one for each agent where Ii : V →{ 0,1} is such that
 n
i=1 Ii(v) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V ,a n d
ti : V → [0,1]. The function Ii is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if and only if agent
1 wins the object. The function ti returns player i’s payment to the seller as a function of the
valuations proﬁle. The restriction that
 n
i=1 Ii(v) ≤ 1 just says that no more than one agent can
get the object. If the mechanism awards the object to a bidder with the highest valuation, we
say that auction is ex-post eﬃcient. Note that the probability that a bidder i of type vi wins the
auction is given by Qi(vi)=
 
V−i Ii(vi,v −i)dF−i(v−i), where V−i =[ 0 ,1]n−1 is the set of valuation
proﬁles of the agents other than i. In particular, if the mechanism is eﬃcient and if the agents’
valuations are identically distributed according to F, then Qi(vi)=Fn−1(vi). Together with
the primitives of the model, a direct revelation mechanism deﬁnes a Bayesian game. The direct
mechanism is said to be incentive compatible if truthful revelation (the identity function) is an
equilibrium of the corresponding Bayesian game. We can now state our payoﬀ-equivalence result:
Proposition 1 Assume that a risk averse buyer behaves according to the dual theory of choice
under risk with “probability-evaluation” function g. Any incentive compatible auction mechanism
that gives 0 utility to the bidders with valuation 0 yields a utility level of
  vi
0 g(Qi(t))dt to a bidder
with valuation vi. Consequently, bidder i is indiﬀerent among all auction mechanisms that induce
the same winning probability function Qi and that yield a 0 utility to his lowest valuation type.
Proof : Consider a risk averse buyer whose risk preferences are represented by the dual function
g.L e t xi : V → I R be the random variable of bidder i’s payoﬀ determined by the mechanism
 (Ii,t i)i∈N :
xi(vi,v −i)=viI(vi,v −i) − ti(vi,v −i).
Letting Gxi(vi) be the DDF of the above random variable conditional on vi being the type of





where m is a lower bound of xi.
Since the mechanism is incentive compatible, type vi of agent i should prefer the above random




i,v −i) − ti(v 
i,v −i).
Adding and subtracting v 
iIi(v 
i,v −i) in the above expression we get
yi(vi,v 
i)=xi(v 
i,v −i)+( vi − v 
i)Ii(v 
i,v −i).
That is, by reporting v 
i,t y p evi gets a sum of two random variables: the random payoﬀ type v 
i
would get and the diﬀerence in valuations vi −v 
i that he obtains when he wins the object. Let r
and s be two comonotonic random variables such that r and xi(v 
i,v −i) have the same DDF and
so do s and (vi − v 
i)Ii(v 
i,v −i). By comonotonicity, type vi’s utility of the sum r + s is the sum
of the utilities. By the way r and s were chosen, and since, by independence, both types vi and
v 
i evaluate random variables (deﬁned on the other bidders’ types) in the same way, we have that
this sum of utilities is
Ui(v 




i,v −i)a n d( vi − v 
i)Ii(v 
i,v −i), however, are not comonotonic, the random variable
yi(vi,v 
i) second-order stochastically dominates r + s (see M¨ uller (1997) or Goovaerts, Dahene,
and De Schepper (2000)). Therefore, since agent i is risk averse, vi’s the utility of yi(vi,v 
i)i sa t
least as high as Ui(v 
i)+(vi −v 
i)g(Qi(v 
i)). By incentive compatibility of the mechanism we have
that type vi prefers xi to yi, which in turn implies that
Ui(vi) ≥ Ui(v 
i)+( vi − v 
i)g(Q(v 
i)).
Since this is true for every pair of possible types, we have that Ui is diﬀerentiable and
U 
i(vi)=g(Qi(vi)) ∀vi ∈ [0,1].






Corollary 1 Assume that bidders’ valuations are independently and identically distributed ac-
cording to F. In any ex-post eﬃcient mechanism that yields 0 utility to the lowest type of bidder
i, the equilibrium utility of a bidder with valuation vi is
  vi
0 g[Fn−1(t)]dt. Consequently, bidders
are indiﬀerent among all the ex-post eﬃcient auction mechanisms that give 0 utility to the lowest
valuation bidders.
9Matthews (1987) shows that an expected utility maximizer bidder with CARA von Neumann
Morgenstern utility function is indiﬀerent between participating in a ﬁrst price auction or in a
second price auction with IID ex ante identical buyers. Since a buyer who satisﬁes the dual theory
axioms exhibits constant average risk aversion, the above result suggests that constant absolute
risk aversion is what lies behind the utility equivalence result. This conjecture, however, is left
for further research.
Risk aversion in the ﬁrst price auction
The equilibrium bidding function that appears in (3) allows us to predict the eﬀect of an in
increase buyers’ risk aversion on their bids, and therefore on the seller’s revenue. Remember that
a dual utility maximizer becomes more risk averse when his dual function undergoes a convex
transformation.2
Proposition 2 Suppose that the buyers’ valuations are identically and independently distrib-
uted and that all buyers share a common dual utility function. In the ﬁrst price auction, as
bidders become more risk averse, they make uniformly higher bids.
Proof : An immediate corollary of the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let h :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] and H :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] be two continuous and increasing functions
with h(0) = 0 and H(0) = 0. Assume further that H is strictly increasing and that h is convex.








Proof : Take v ∈ (0,1]. Since g is convex, for all λ and p in [0,1] we have g(λp) ≤ λg(p).




g(H(v)), ∀t ≤ v.









Rearranging, we get the desired result. ✷
2Proposition 2 can be found in Salo and Weber (1995), though with a diﬀerent dressing. Since the proof is
simple, we give it here for the reader’s convenience.
10Since under the dual theory, becoming more risk averse means applying a convex transformation
to the dual utility function, the above lemma implies that more risk averse buyers shade their
bids less. ✷
Riley and Samuelson (1981) show that in the case of ex ante identical risk averse expected
utility maximizing buyers, the reserve price that maximizes the seller’s revenue decreases with
the buyers’ degree of risk aversion. The following proposition shows that the same holds in the
case of risk averse buyers who behave according to the dual theory.
Proposition 3 Assume that the buyers’ valuations are drawn independently and identically
from a strictly increasing and twice continuously diﬀerentiable distribution F :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1],
and that all buyers share a common probability-evaluation function, g. Assume that the seller












Further, this optimal reserve price is a non-increasing function of the buyers’ risk aversion.
Proof : The expected revenue of a ﬁrst price auction with reserve price b, and when the bidders’









A risk neutral seller chooses a reserve price so as to maximize the expected revenue. Taking


















which proves the ﬁrst part of the claim.
Now let h :[ 0 ,1] → [0,1] be a convex function such that h(0) = 0 and h(1) = 1 and let f ≡ h◦g.
The function f represents preferences that are more risk averse than the preferences represented
by g. Letting Rf be the revenue function when the bidders’ preferences are represented by f,w e
will show ﬁrst that the diﬀerence Rg −Rf is a non-decreasing function of the reserve price. Since
11h is convex, for all λ and p in [0,1] we have h(λp) ≤ λh(p). Taking λ = g[Fn−1(b∗)]/g[Fn−1(v)]


























which by (7) is non-negative. Therefore the diﬀerence Rg −Rf is non-decreasing. Now let bg and
bf be optimal reserve prices when the preferences are represented by g and f, respectively. We
must have, Rg(bg) ≥ Rg(bf)a n dRf(bf) ≥ Rf(bg), which implies that
Rg(bg) − Rf(bg) ≥ Rg(bf) − Rf(bf).
Since Rg − Rf is non-decreasing, we conclude that bg ≥ bf. ✷
The Case of Expected Utility Maximizers: A Comparison
An agent who satisﬁes the axioms of the expected utility theory is characterized by his von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, u, that can be chosen so as to solve the following pref-
erence equation: [1,u(x)] ∼ [x,1] for all x in the domain (see Yaari (1987) or Fishburn (1982)).
Similarly, the dual “probability-evaluation” function that represents the preferences of an agent
who behaves according to the dual theory can be chosen so as to solve [1,p] ∼ [g(p),1] for all
p ∈ [0,1] (see Theorem 1). Consequently, given ﬁxed preferences over lotteries, the functions
u and g that solve the above preference equations are the inverses of each other. It would be
interesting to compare the equilibrium bidding functions of buyers who behave according to the
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u with those of buyers who behave according to the
dual functions g. Although no general result is available, in the case of constant relative risk
aversion the following claim is easily proved.
Proposition 4 Consider an individual with von Neumann-Morgenstern (CRRA) utility function
u(x)=x1/m participating in a n-bidder ﬁrst price auction. His equilibrium behavior is identical
to the equilibrium behavior of a bidder whose dual function is given by g(p)=pm. In other
12words, in both cases the best response correspondences coincide.
Proof : Note that an individual whose valuation is vi submits a bid of b, then he gets the lottery
[vi − b,p(b)], where p(b) is the probability that the individual wins the object given his bid and
the other bidders’ strategies. For every type, bidding above his valuation is a strictly dominated
strategy. Therefore it is enough to compare the two diﬀerent preferences over the family of
lotteries of the form [x,p], where x ≥ 0. Now, in this case an individual whose risk preferences
can be represented by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u prefers lottery [x,p]t o
lottery [y,q] if and only if x1/mp>y 1/qq, which in turn holds if and only if xpm >y q m. But this
last inequality holds if and only if an individual whose risk preferences can be represented by the
dual function g prefers lottery [x,p] to lottery [y,q]. ✷
Therefore, the behavior in a ﬁrst price auction of an expected utility maximizer with a von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(x)=x1/m is indistinguishable from the behavior of
a bidder whose preferences can be described by the dual theory with “probability-evaluation”
function g(p)=pm. Clearly, this does not mean that the utility equivalence holds for this kind
of expected utility maximizer. We know that this kind of bidder is not indiﬀerent between ﬁrst
price and second price auctions. The result, however, does not generalize for other von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions.
3 Risk aversion in a Sealed-Bid Double Auction
In this section we look at the sealed-bid double auction introduced by Chatterjee and Samuelson
(1983), when both bargainers behave according to the dual theory of choice under risk. As will
be seen, our analysis follows closely that of Leininger, Linhart, and Radner (1989), which is again
evidence that introducing risk aversion via the dual theory does not add any technical diﬃculty
to the analysis. We focus on the “linear” strategies of this mechanism and check the eﬀect of
changes in the degree of risk aversion on the equilibrium strategies, on the probability of trade,
and on the ex post ineﬃciency of the equilibrium outcome.
A potential buyer and a potential seller are bargaining over the price of a single object. Their
respective valuations of the object are independently, identically and uniformly distributed over
[0,1]. The sealed-bid mechanism is deﬁned as follows: The buyer and the seller simultaneously
submit their bids, b and s, respectively. If b ≥ s, trade takes place at the price (b+s)/2. If b<s
there is no trade.
We are interested in ﬁnding equilibrium strategies when both players’ preferences satisfy the
axioms of the dual theory of choice under risk, the buyer’s dual function being f and the seller’s
g. Further, we are interested in the inﬂuence of changes in the degree of risk aversion on the
13equilibrium strategies and on the equilibrium terms of trade.
Consider a buyer with valuation v and let ˜ eb be the random variable of his earnings when
he bids b and the seller’s bid is distributed according to the cumulative distribution function S.
Then we have
Pr{˜ eb >x } =P r {v − b+s
2 >xand s<b }
=P r {s<2(v − x) − b and s<b }
=P r {s<min{2(v − x) − b;b}}
= S(min{2(v − x) − b;b}).









v−b f[S(2(v − x) − b)]dx.
Similarly, the utility of a seller with valuation c of a bid s when the buyer’s bid is distributed




0 g[(1 − B(max{2(c + x) − s;s}))]dx
=
  s−c
0 g[1 − B(s)]dx +
  1+s
2 −c
s−c g[1 − B(2(c + x) − s)]dx.
(8)










Making the change of variable y =2 ( v − x) − b, the above equation can be written
−(f ◦ S(b)) + (v − b)(f ◦ S) (b) − 1/2
  b
0
(f ◦ S) (y)dy − 1/2(f ◦ S)(0) + (f ◦ S)(b)=0
or
−(f ◦ S(b)) + (v − b)(f ◦ S) (b) −
(f ◦ S)(b) − (f ◦ S)(0)
2






(f ◦ S) (b)
+ b. (9)
14The second order condition requires that
−3(f ◦ S) (b)
2
+
(f ◦ S)(b)(f ◦ S)  (b)
2(f ◦ S) (b)
< 0 (10)
which is satisﬁed if and only if the right hand side of (9) is strictly increasing. Therefore, if (10)
holds, equation (9) deﬁnes the inverse, β−1, of the buyer’s equilibrium strategy β which is strictly
increasing.





(g ◦ (1 − B)) (s)
+ s (11)
which determines the inverse σ−1 of the seller’s strictly increasing equilibrium strategy σ.S i n c e
β is strictly monotone and the buyer’s valuation is uniform, we have
B[β(x) ]=P r [ β(v) ≤ β(x)]

















[g ◦ (1 − B)](x)
[g ◦ (1 − B)] (x)
+ x. (13)
In order to get an explicit analytic solution to the system of diﬀerential equations (12)–(13),
we must make some simplifying assumptions about the dual functions f and g. Speciﬁcally,
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1−a ≤ b ≤ h
1i f b ≥ h
S(s)=

         
         
0i f 0 ≤ s<a
(s − a)h
h − a
if a ≤ s ≤ 1 − a1−h
h









α (1 + 2δ)
α + δ +2αδ
. (15)
This solution corresponds to the following linear equilibrium strategies:
β(v)=h −







It is not diﬃcult to check that this is the only linear equilibrium of the sealed-bid mechanism.
According to these equilibrium strategies, the buyer will never bid more than h and the seller
will never bid less than a. Therefore, the range of equilibrium prices is the interval [a,h]. Also,
since
β(1) = h = σ(h) <σ (1)
16and
β(0) <β (a)=a = σ(0),
the linearity of the strategies imply that β(v) <σ (c), for all v ≤ c. In other words, there is trade
only if v>c . On the other hand, the equilibrium is ex-post ineﬃcient because there might be
no trade even if v>c .
Proposition 5 Assume that the buyer’s preferences satisfy the dual theory axioms and can be
represented by the dual function f(p)=pα. Similarly, assume that the seller’s preferences can
be represented by the dual function g(p)=pδ. In the only linear equilibrium, the equilibrium
range of prices moves to the right as the buyer becomes more risk averse, and moves to the left
as the seller becomes more risk averse. Further, the probability of trade is an increasing function
of the trades’ degree of risk aversion. When both players have the same risk preferences, namely
α = δ = m, the equilibrium price interval converges to [0,1] as the degree of risk aversion, m,
becomes arbitrarily large. In this case the probability of trade tends to 1/2 as m goes to ∞.
Proof : It can be checked that both a and h are strictly increasing functions of α and strictly
decreasing functions of δ. Consequently, the range of equilibrium prices moves to the left as the
buyer becomes more risk averse, and moves to the right as the seller becomes more risk averse.









It can be seen that as m tends to ∞, the price interval tends to [0,1], which means that as risk
aversion becomes arbitrarily large, the ex post ineﬃciency of the mechanism tends to vanish.
This feature can also be seen from the probability of trade. Let v be the valuation of the
potential buyer. Given the equilibrium strategies in (16) the probability of trade, conditional on
the buyer’s valuation, is









1−a v ≥ a.
17Since there is trade only if v ≥ a, the overall probability of trade is











When both traders are risk averse, namely α,δ > 1, the above expression is increasing in α and
δ. This means that an increase in a player’s risk aversion, leads to an increase in the probability
of trade. When the seller and the buyer have the same risk preferences, namely when α = δ = m,





and tends to 1/2 as m tends to ∞. In other words, when the common degree of risk aversion
tends to inﬁnity, the probability of trade tends to 1/2. This is because in the limit there is trade
if and only if the value of the object to the buyer is at least as large as the value of the object to
the seller. ✷
4 Concluding Remarks
It has been shown that the dual theory of choice under risk is quite apt for the analysis of
single item auctions. In particular, the introduction of risk aversion does not seem to complicate
the analysis of auctions beyond the standard diﬃculty of auctions with risk neutral buyers.
Many open issues remain that the theory needs to deal with before we conclude that it is a
most appropriate tool for the analysis of auctions. Among the topics for future research we
can mention the analysis of common value auctions, auctions with an endogenously determined
number of bidders, and especially, the design of optimal auctions.
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